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Measurements with photodetectors are naturally described in the infinite dimensional Fock space
of one or several modes. For some measurements a model has been postulated which describes
the full mode measurement as a composition of a mapping (squashing) of the signal into a small
dimensional Hilbert space followed by a specified target measurement. We present a formalism to
investigate whether a given measurement pair of full and target measurements can be connected
by a squashing model. We show that a measurement used in the BB84 protocol does allow a
squashing description, although the corresponding six-state protocol measurement does not. As a
result, security proofs for the BB84 protocol can be based on the assumption that the eavesdropper
forwards at most one photon, while the same does not hold for the six-state protocol.
PACS numbers: 42.50.Ex, 03.67Dd, 03.67.Hk, 42.79.Sz
Detection devices play an important role in quantum
communication protocols. In the theoretic design of these
protocols, signals are often thought of as qubits, and
therefore low-dimensional Hilbert spaces only need to be
considered. In optical implementations, the signals are
realized by photons, which are naturally described by
the Fock spaces of spatio-temporal modes. Our goal is
to determine how one can reduce the large-dimensional
description of optical measurements of these modes to a
particular lower-dimensional one. Our insight will pro-
vide a powerful tool to ease the analysis of optical imple-
mentations of quantum communication protocols.
A typical measurement in quantum communication is
the one used in the BB84 QKD protocol [1], in which
the incoming light is split by a polarizing beam-splitter,
which can be oriented either along the horizontal/vertical
basis (labelled as z) or in the +45/-45 degree basis (la-
belled as x). The signal is then sent to a threshold detec-
tor which cannot resolve the number of photons by which
they are triggered. This measurement can be described
as a single Positive Operator Valued Measure (POVM)
with non-commuting POVM elements if the basis choice
is done at random with some fixed probabilities. It has
been postulated that there exists a squashing model for
this set-up, which first maps (squashes) the incoming sig-
nal to a one-photon polarization Hilbert space, followed
by the same BB84 measurement. A recent important
security proof [2] is based on this detector property.
In this Letter, we define a squashing model and lay
out a framework to determine whether a given detection
device allows a squashing model. We then prove for the
BB84 measurement that a squashing model exists. Sur-
prisingly, the corresponding measurement in the six-state
protocol [3, 4] does not admit a squashing model. More
details of these results will be presented in a future paper.
First, we will define a squashing model more precisely.
A full measurement, FM , described by a POVM with
elements F
(i)
M defined on a large (possibly infinite dimen-
sional) Hilbert space M is said to admit a squashing
model with respect to a target measurement, FQ, with
POVM elements F
(i)
Q on a smaller dimensional Hilbert
space Q if a squashing map Λ from M to Q exists, such
that the composition of the squashing map and the mea-
surement on Q is statistically equivalent to the measure-
ment on systemM . In other words, the two measurement
models in Fig. 1 must act identically for any input signal.
The measurement description via the POVM elements
F
(i)
M and F
(i)
Q need not correspond to the basic events by
the detectors, such as the pattern of detector clicks, but
can involve some post-processing. For example, in the
optical implementation of the BB84 measurement above,
double clicks occur if both detectors fire due to a multi-
photon input, while after squashing, at most one photon
is contained in the signal and so no double clicks can
occur. Therefore, to match the number of possible out-
comes, we can choose to map double clicks of the full
measurement randomly to the single-click event of one
of the two detectors. This mapping has been introduced
before in the security analysis of QKD [5, 6].
In the context of QKD, one typically assumes the cal-
ibrated device scenario in which the detection device is
trusted and known. Then if a squash model exists, the
corresponding squashing map can become part of the
eavesdropper’s (Eve’s) attack. Therefore we can assume,
without loss of generality, that Eve sends a signal in the
Hilbert space Q to the receiver, Bob. As an example,
many security proofs assume that Eve forwards polarized
single photons (qubits) or vacuum states to the receiver.
If a given full optical implementation of a polarization
measurement has a squash model connecting it to the sin-
gle photon polarization measurement assumed in the se-
curity proof, then this proof is also valid for the full opti-
cal implementation of the protocol. Additionally, squash-
2FIG. 1: The full measurement FM (above) has a general op-
tical input ρin, which is first measured by a receiver’s phys-
ical detector B, followed by classical post-processing. The
squashed measurement (below) has the same general optical
input ρin, which is then squashed by a map Λ to a smaller
Hilbert space, followed by a fixed physical measurement FQ.
It is required that both of these measurements produce the
same output statistics for all ρin.
ing the detection to a finite-dimensional system makes it
possible to use the fast converging de Finetti theorems
of Renner [7] on the level of the squashed system, even if
the original full system is infinite dimensional.
Notice that the existence of a squashing model for a
given full measurement FM and target measurement FQ
is the question of the existence of a particular squasher
connecting these measurements. Any valid squasher
must be a trace preserving completely positive map, Λ,
and can be described by a set of Kraus operators {Ak},
which obey
∑
k A
†
kAk = 1M . The statistical equivalence
of the full measurement FM and concatenation of Λ and
FQ can be stated formally as
Tr
[
ρinF
(i)
M
]
= Tr
[
Λ(ρin)F
(i)
Q
]
=Tr
[∑
k
AkρinA
†
kF
(i)
Q
]
= Tr
[
ρin
∑
k
A†kF
(i)
Q Ak
]
=Tr
[
ρinΛ
†(F
(i)
Q )
] (1)
where ρin is the density matrix of the incoming signal.
We require Eqn. (1) to hold for all incoming signals ρin,
which is fulfilled if and only if
F
(i)
M = Λ
†(F
(i)
Q ) =
∑
k
A†kF
(i)
Q Ak (2)
holds. That is, the adjoint squashing map Λ† with Kraus
operators A†k map each qubit POVM operator to the cor-
responding POVM operator for the mode detector. The
adjoint map is again a completely positive map. It is not
necessarily trace preserving, but it is unital.
The question for the existence of a suitable adjoint
squashing map Λ† has been formulated as the search
for a suitable set of Kraus operators {A†k}. As the
Kraus operators are not unique, we reformulate the con-
dition Eqn. (2) using the Choi-Jamio lkowski isomorphism
[8, 9]. It relates the map Λ† to a bipartite operator
τ on a duplicated output Hilbert space QQ′ by ap-
plying the map to half of a maximally entangled state
|ψ+〉 = 1/
√
d
∑d
i=1 |i〉Q|i〉Q′ , where d = dim(QQ′), by
τ = Λ† ⊗ id (|ψ+〉〈ψ+|). From this representation one
can form the transfer matrix τR by reordering the coef-
ficients via 〈k, k′|τR|l, l′〉 = 〈k, l|τ |k′, l′〉. Given an op-
erator O =
∑
i,j oi,j |i〉〈j|, we introduce its vector no-
tation as |O〉〉 = ∑i,j oi,j |i〉|j〉, and so we can write
|Λ†(O)〉〉 = τR|O〉〉. In this formulation, the search for a
squashing model for a full measurement FM and a target
measurement FQ is the search for a map τ such that
τR|F (i)Q 〉〉 = |F (i)M 〉〉, (3a)
〈k, k′|τR|l, l′〉 = 〈k, l|τ |k′, l′〉, (3b)
τ† = τ ≥ 0. (3c)
Here, τ corresponds to the adjoint map Λ†. The
constraint that Λ† be unital, and therefore Λ trace-
preserving, is already contained in the above conditions,
as the POVM elements on M and Q each add up to the
identity operator in their respective Hilbert spaces, as
can be easily seen in the formulation of Eqn. (2). Overall,
we have reformulated the search for a suitable squashing
operation as the search for a positive semidefinite oper-
ator τ that satisfies a fixed number of linear constraints,
which can be efficiently solved using convex optimiza-
tion. Searching for completely positive maps using these
techniques has been used, for example, in [10, 11].
To simplify the search for the appropriate squashing
operation, we can exploit further properties of the phys-
ical measurement. Typical measurement schemes only
involve photon counting and hence commute with a quan-
tum non-demolition (QND) measurement of the total
number of photons. Consequently, we can decompose
the squashing operation into a photon number measure-
ment, followed by the appropriate squashing operation
conditioned on the outcome of the QND measurement, as
schematically indicated in Fig. 2. This model now casts
the problem into finite dimensions, since we only need to
find the corresponding map for each finite dimensional
photon number subspace.
We now consider the situation where we choose as tar-
get measurements the full measurement restricted to the
Fock space containing zero or one photon, which is a
qutrit space. As the resulting POVM elements F
(i)
Q still
commute with a QND measurement of the total pho-
ton number, this means that the squashing map can be
thought of as statistically outputting either no photon or
one photon. We can now split off the zero-photon case
easily in the typical scenario, where the full and target
measurements have the vacuum projection as one POVM
3FIG. 2: Reduction of the considered squashing operation of
the BB84 protocol. The squashing operation can be mod-
elled as a photon number measurement followed by a projec-
tion measurement onto a 4-dimensional subspace. Depending
on the outcome of these measurements, one either proceeds
with a low-dimensional squashing operation ΛPn or outputs a
completely mixed qubit state.
element, while none of the other elements contains a vac-
uum component. As a result, the squasher will output a
vacuum signal if and only if the photon number n mea-
sured in the QND measurement on the input mode space
is zero. To simplify the presentation, we split these events
off as a flag (see Fig. 2) sent by the squasher, signalling
that the input signal contains no photon, and we can
now restrict ourselves to the case that for n ≥ 1 input
photons, the squasher outputs exactly one photon in the
relevant modes, which enters the target measurement. In
the case of the BB84 and the six-state measurements two
polarization modes are sufficient to describe the multi-
photon Hilbert space, so we can assume that for n 6= 0
exactly one qubit in the form of a photon with polar-
ization degrees of freedom is output from the squashing
operation. In this formulation, the POVM elements F
(i)
Q
are now restricted to the full measurements of the one-
photon Hilbert space, as the vacuum events have been
replaced by the flag structure of the squasher.
As a third step, we refine the squasher further by using
the specific structure of the BB84 measurement. Here
the full measurement operators on the n-photon subspace
(n ≥ 1) can be conveniently written as
F
(b,α)
M, n =
(−1)b
4
(|n, 0〉α〈n, 0| − |0, n〉α〈0, n|) +
1
4
, (4)
where α ∈ {x, z} labels the basis choice for the polar-
izing beamsplitter, b ∈ {0, 1} corresponds to the “0” or
“1” outcome of the detector, and |l, k〉α is a two-mode
Fock state with photon numbers l and k with respect to
the polarization mode basis α. We define a subspace P
spanned by the 4 vectors |n, 0〉α and |0, n〉α, and its or-
thogonal complement P⊥ in the n-photon subspace. A
QND measurement with respect to these two subspaces
commutes with each measurement POVM F
(i)
Q , and thus
can precede the target detection scheme without loss of
generality. We can therefore define independent squash-
ing maps for each of the two sub-spaces, similarly to
the treatment of the Fock spaces of photon number n.
It is now easy to identify the squashing map starting
on the P⊥-subspace since the POVM elements F
(b,α)
M,n re-
stricted to this subspace are given by 1P⊥/2. An obvious
choice for the squashing map here is to output the com-
pletely mixed qubit state, which triggers each POVM
F
(b,α)
Q with equal probability (see Fig. 2). This means
we can now focus on the remaining part of the squashing
operation, namely for all n ≥ 1 the maps ΛPn from the
four-dimensional subspace P of the n-photon Fock space
to the qubit space.
If the incoming signal is projected onto the subspace
P , then either the map τodd or τeven will be applied,
depending on the parity of photon number n. First con-
sider the case where n ≥ 3, the outcome of the QND
measurement of the total photon number, is odd; the
case n = 1 is trivial. We use the following orthonor-
mal basis to represent the 4-dimensional subspace P :
|φ1〉 = |n, 0〉z, |φ2〉 = |0, n〉z, and
|φ3〉 = 1C1
(√
2n−2(|n, 0〉x + |0, n〉x)− |n, 0〉z
)
|φ4〉 = 1C1
(√
2n−2(|n, 0〉x − |0, n〉x)− |0, n〉z
) , (5)
where we define Cg ≡
√
2n−g − 1. The qubit measure-
ment operators F
(b,α)
Q are given by:
{(
1
2 0
0 0
)
,
(
0 0
0 12
)
,
1
4
(
1 1
1 1
)
,
1
4
(
1 −1
−1 1
)}
(6)
in the standard basis. The full measurement operators
F
(b,α)
M, n from Eqn. (4) in the basis given by Eqn. (5) are
F
(b,z)
M, n=


1−b
2 0 0 0
0 b2 0 0
0 0 14 0
0 0 0 14

, F (b,x)M, n= 14 + (−1)
b
4


0 s 0 t
s 0 t 0
0 t 0 u
t 0 u 0


where 1 is the 4 × 4 identity matrix and we define the
constants s ≡ 21−n, t ≡ sC1, u ≡ 1 − s. To obtain their
vectorized form |F (b,α)Q 〉〉 and |F (b,α)M 〉〉, one needs to con-
catenate the columns of their matrix form into vectors.
Now we are ready to impose Eqs. (3) on the adjoint
squashing map. First note that τR maps real vectors
into real vectors (Eqn. (3a)), and therefore the complex
conjugate (τR)∗ also maps these vectors to each other.
As a result, the average of these two also performs the
mapping, and so we can assume that τR is a matrix with
real entries. Also, the target measurement operators,
|F (b,α)Q 〉〉, only span a three dimensional vector-space, so
the matrix τR is not completely determined by the linear
constraints. Keeping the undetermined entries as open
4parameters ai, we then obtain τodd, which is given by

1 0 0 a1 0 a2 0 a3
0 0 s− a1 0 −a2 0 t− a3 0
0 s− a1 0 0 0 a4 0 a5
a1 0 0 1 t− a4 0 −a5 0
0 −a2 0 t− a4 12 0 0 a6
a2 0 a4 0 0
1
2 u− a6 0
0 t− a3 0 −a5 0 u− a6 12 0
a3 0 a5 0 a6 0 0
1
2


.
Using the assignment a1 = s, a2 = 0, a3 = t, a4 = 0, a5 =
0, a6 = 1/2 − s for the open parameters ensures that τ
is positive semidefinite. By considering suitable subde-
terminants it can be shown that these parameters must
be chosen this way, and therefore the squashing map is
unique. Further details will be included in a future pa-
per. Following a similar procedure we can also construct
the unique adjoint squashing operation for even n ≥ 2.
Therefore, the squashing operation for the BB84 detector
with active basis choice and the described post-processing
exists.
The six-state protocol adds another measurement di-
rection to the BB84 setting, which sorts the polariza-
tion of the incoming photons according to a circular ba-
sis choice (labelled y). Using the same post-processing
scheme of the double clicks results in similar measure-
ment operators as given by Eqn. (4) with α ∈ {x, y, z}
as well as performing a renormalization. Hence the over-
all measurement description of the six-state protocol is
similar to the BB84 case, where the transfer matrix τR
is now completely determined by the linear constraints,
as the POVM elements of FQ span the whole opera-
tor space. However, this measurement device cannot
be squashed down to the qubit level, since τ 6≥ 0. We
can verify this statement independent of any of the re-
ductions introduced earlier: all we need to show is that
τ = Λ† ⊗ id(|ψ+〉〈ψ+|) 6≥ 0. Since the qubit measure-
ments of the six-state protocol are complete, the in-
put operator |ψ+〉〈ψ+| can be expanded into the basis
{F (i)Q ⊗ σj}, where the σj are the Pauli operators:
|ψ+〉〈ψ+| = 1
4
{
1Q⊗1Q′+3
∑
α={x,y,z}
(
F
(0,α)
Q − F (1,α)Q
)
⊗σTα
}
.
This decomposition has the advantage that the adjoint
map Λ† can be applied directly to the first subsystem by
using the substitution F
(i)
Q 7→ F (i)M , which is clear from
the properties of the adjoint squasher. This operator
τ has negative eigenvalues, starting in the three photon
subspace. For example, if one tests the operator with the
state
|θ−〉 = 1√
2
(
|3, 0〉Mz ⊗ |1〉Q′ − |0, 3〉Mz ⊗ |0〉Q′
)
, (7)
where |0〉Q′ and |1〉Q′ are canonical orthogonal basis
states, we find 〈θ−|τ |θ−〉 = −1/8. This proves that a
squashing map for the six-state protocol does not exist.
To summarize, we have given necessary and sufficient
linear conditions on a positive operator so that a full
measurement can be represented by a concatenation of a
squashing operation and a lower dimensional target mea-
surement. In application to security proofs of QKD, the
existence of a squashing model allows a simple qubit-
based security proof to be lifted to one based on the full
optical implementation, as is the case for the BB84 mea-
surement, and any other protocol using the same mea-
surement. The squashing model for this BB84 measure-
ment has been independently obtained by Tsurumaru
and Tamaki [12]. In the absence of a squashing model
such a shortcut is not possible and another method of
proving security of the full optical scenario has to be
found, such as for the six-state measurement. Note that
other post-processing methods of the full measurement
and target measurements could lead to a squashing model
for the six-state protocol detector. As the squashing
property holds for the detection set-up independent of
the use of the detection device, the method outlined in
our Letter will help to simplify the analysis in other quan-
tum communication contexts, including the verification
of entanglement of optical modes with threshold detec-
tors.
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